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INTRODUCTION
This paper offers a new take on Windsor v. the United States,1 a case on
everyone's mind as this issue goes to print given the Supreme Court's recent
grant of certiorari in the same-sex marriage cases.2 Be warned, though.
Academics usually come to bury opinions, not to praise them, so I'm stepping
* J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This is a lightly footnoted, lightly
edited version of the Annual Distinguished Lecture delivered at the Boston University
School of Law. I owe thanks to the dean and the faculty of Boston University Law School
for the kind invitation to deliver the lecture and their warm and thoughtful reception to my
remarks. Special thanks go to Professor James Fleming, who was the most gracious of hosts.
It was a particular pleasure to deliver this lecture at B.U. given the many members of the
faculty who have written on Windsor or, in the case of Professor Silbaugh, were involved in
the litigation itself. I am indebted to a wonderful set of readers: Marc Poirier, Alex Hemmer,
Sundeep Iyer, David Louk, and Erica Newland. Thanks also to the faculty of the University
of Illinois Law School for their helpful suggestions. Excellent research assistance was
provided by Tom Brown, Marguerite Colson, Rebecca Lee, Daniel Rauch, David Simins,
and Meng Jia Yang.
133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
2 DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3315 (U.S.
Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571) (granting certiorari in four cases consolidated for appeal).
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out of role by saying something nice about a Supreme Court opinion. But I
think there's a bit of mad genius in Windsor and that academics have been too
quick to dismiss its insights.
While Windsor flouts just about everything we teach our students about
constitutional law, it is right to do so. Its author, Justice Kennedy, blurs the
lines between federalism, liberty, and equality, and he blurs the lines between
structure and rights. The genius of the opinion is that it recognizes that rights
and structure are like two interlocking gears, moving the grand constitutional
project of integration forward. While the doctrine isn't built to recognizing that
reality, that's the doctrine's problem, not Windsor's.
Part I describes the opinion and catalogs the many doctrinal and rhetorical
puzzles embedded in it. Part 1I discusses the core but neglected truth at the
heart of the opinion-the fact that rights and structure work together to move
debates forward, with federalism compensating for the shortcomings of the
First Amendment. Part III argues that Windsor is best understood as an effort
to "clear the channels of political change" and allow proponents of marriage
equality to take full advantage of the discursive benefits of structure.
I. WINDSOR'S MANY MYSTERIES
Most scholars were happy about the result in the Windsor but looked
askance at its reasoning3-the academic equivalent of loving the sinner but
hating the sin. Because Windsor struck down the part of the Defensive of
Marriage Act ("DOMA") 4 that withheld federal recognition from state-
recognized same-sex marriages, it is yet-another step in the path toward
marriage equality and thus to be celebrated. But Justice Kennedy's reasoning
left much to be desired according to those who wrote in the opinion's wake.
That's because Justice Kennedy invoked both rights and structure to justify the
Court's decision. He spoke of same-sex marriage as a question implicating
both equality and liberty, the twin values of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.5 And yet he also cast the decision as vindicating the principles
of federalism. By pairing rights and structure in this fashion, Justice Kennedy
elicited a collective groan from the academy.
For those of you who haven't read the opinion, let me walk you through it.
The lead-in of the merits analysis places it squarely in the federalism camp by
framing the case as a conflict between state and federal regulatory authority.6
3 See infra sources cited in note 25.
4 Pub. L. No. 10-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
5 Because this case involved a challenge to a federal statute, Fourteenth Amendment
arguments were run through the Fifth Amendment. Indeed, the Court states that "the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that Fifth Amendment right all
the more specific and all the better understood and preserved." Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
6 Id. at 2689-92 (discussing the states' traditional role in defining marriage and its
relationship to DOMA); id. at 2692 (stating that New York's "actions were without doubt a
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There's a lot of federalism in the opinion as well. Indeed, Kennedy mentions
state sovereignty and states' authority over marriage no fewer than eleven
times.
Just when you start thinking that you've got a federalism opinion on your
hands, however, Justice Kennedy switches gears. DOMA, he writes, is
constitutionally vulnerable "quite apart from the principles of federalism."
7
Enter the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Kennedy notes that the states
have conferred "a dignity and status of immense import" on same-sex couples
and thereby "enhanced the recognition, dignity, and protection of the class in
their own community."'8 All of Justice Kennedy's favorite themes begin to
emerge, as he quotes his own opinion in Lawrence9 and waxes eloquent about
the "dignity of that [marital] bond" and New York's "legal acknowledgment of
the intimate relationship between two people."'0 Aha, you start to think, it's a
liberty decision-Justice Kennedy's favorite flavor of constitutional analysis.
But wait, there's more, as they say in infomercials. Because equality talk
also creeps into the opinion." Federal law, Kennedy writes, is "designed to
injure the same class the State seeks to protect.' 2 Take a moment and turn this
passage over in your head:
This is strong evidence of a law having the purpose and effect of
disapproval of that class. The avowed purpose and practical effect of the law
here in question are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a
stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the
unquestioned authority of the States.'
3
It's equal protection, right? Indeed, as Boston University's Linda McClain
has astutely pointed out,14 it sounds a lot like Romer v. Evans.'5 In Romer, you
may remember, Justice Kennedy struck down an amendment to the Colorado
state constitution that required that equality guarantees for gays and lesbians be
passed at the state level. By asserting that the breadth and narrowness of the
proper exercise of its sovereign authority within our federal system, all in the way that the
Framers of the Constitution intended.").
7 Id. at 2692.
8 Id.; see also id. (finding that DOMA, by denying federal recognition of these
marriages, "requires [the] Court to address whether the resulting injury and indignity is a
deprivation of an essential part of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment").
9 Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003).
10 Id.
" See, e.g., id. at 2689 (describing same-sex couples enjoying "a status of equality with
all other married persons").
12 Id.
13 Id. at 2693.
1 See Linda McClain, From Romer v. Evans to United States v. Windsor, 20 DuKE J.
GENDER L. & POL'Y 351, 353 (2013) (terming Romer "the template" for Windsor); see also
Marc R. Poirier, "Whiffs of Federalism" in United States v. Windsor: Power, Localism, and
Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REv. 935, 978 (2014) (making a similar point).
15 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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Colorado amendment combined to make it irrational, he managed to condemn
the state initiative as discriminatory even without designating the LGBT
community as a protected class. So, too, by condemning the breadth and
narrowness of DOMA, 16 Justice Kennedy manages to invalidate it without
designating gays and lesbians as a protected class. Moreover, the injury in both
cases was similar. In Romer, it was the decision to move the power to protect
gays and lesbians up from the local to the state level, thus preventing Boulder
and like-minded cities from passing equality laws.17 In Windsor, it was the
decision to move the power to decide what constituted marriage under federal
law from the state to federal level, thus preventing New York and likeminded
states from conferring federal marriage benefits on same-sex couples.
Kennedy blurs the lines between rights and structure even more in Windsor,
and it's this part of the opinion that causes academics' heads to explode. He
goes so far as to equate federal interference with state marriage laws
(technically, a federalism question) with discrimination against gays and
lesbians (technically, an equality question).'8 Indeed, almost every time he
describes the rights deprivation at issue in Windsor, he refers to DOMA taking
away a right or status that the states have conferred.19 "The state's power in
defining the marital relation is of central relevance," he writes, "quite apart
from principles of federalism. 20 But the fact that the states have conferred this
status or right matters not at all for the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment claim, be
it liberty or equality, since both claims depend solely on whether federal law
confers the right, not state law.
2 1
16 See, e.g., Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690, 2694, 2695.
17 That makes very little sense as a structural matter, as Justice Scalia doggedly pointed
out in his Romer dissent. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
After all, any decision to move a decision from the local to the state-almost any law passed
at the state level-ends up harming some locally concentrated group by making it harder for
them to achieve their goals at the local level. And yet Justice Kennedy wouldn't commit to
the idea-which undergirded decisions like Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. I (Parents Involved), 551 U.S. 701 (2007), and Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)--that this move was only suspect when it involved a
protected class. Instead, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Romer extended the reasoning of
these cases to what was at least nominally a nonsuspect class without explaining how or
why cases that don't involve protected classes-like state-wide smoking bans or statewide
anti-nepotism rules-were constitutional.
18 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-94.
19 See, e.g., id. at 2689, 2692-96; see also Ernest A. Young, United States v. Windsor
and the Role of State Law in Defining Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REv. 29, 43 (2013) ("At
literally every turn, [Windsor] emphasized the fact that state law had recognized the validity
of Edith Windsor's marriage.").
20 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
21 Randy Barnett pointed out the novelty of this move in the immediate wake of the
opinion. Randy Barnett, Federalism Marries Liberty in the DOMA Decision,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 26, 2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-
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Perhaps most importantly, Justice Kennedy leaves open the possibility that
the national government could override state marriage laws that discriminate
against same-sex couples.22 You can see why commentators were up in arms.
If DOMA is about the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments-be it the equality or
liberty strand-then it's not just DOMA that falls; it's any state marriage law
discriminating against same-sex couples.23 If DOMA loses on federalism
grounds, however, it's because sovereignty shields this traditional area of state
concern from federal interference. That, in turn, means that the national
supremacy trump card can't be played in the marriage debate and that state
bans on same-sex marriage must stand.
Kennedy, however, refuses to follow the logic of either doctrinal line. He
insists DOMA falls on both grounds while saying nothing about the
constitutionality of discriminatory state laws or the fate of equality-forcing
national mandates. To the contrary, the opinion reads as if there is not yet a
Fourteenth Amendment right to same-sex marriage but there will be one
sooner rather than later.
So note Windsor's many mysteries. It's not just that the opinion blends-
seemingly willy-nilly-liberty, equality, and federalism analysis while refusing
to follow the logic of any of those doctrinal lines. It's not just that the opinion
reads as if a federal right to same-sex marriage doesn't exist now but might
well exist later. Windsor's mysteries seep down into the grain of the opinion,
inflecting the text itself. It's strange, for instance, that Windsor repeatedly-
even doggedly--describes the equality and liberty interest here as one
recognized by the state.24 The traditional rights/structure divide doesn't
accommodate such a distinction. As I noted above, if same-sex couples enjoy a
right to marry under the U.S. Constitution, it matters not at all if the right has
been recognized by the state of New York. The last part of Kennedy's phrasing
is pure surplus, and yet he repeats it again and again. That textual pairing-a
right recognized by the state-is just as strange if Windsor is a federalism case.
New York's decision to recognize same-sex marriage would be protected
whether the state were recognizing a constitutional right or just making policy.
marries-liberty-in-the-doma-decision/, archived at http://perma.cc/WLW4-AD6X. See also
Noa Ben-Asher, Conferring Dignity: The Metamorphosis of the Legal Homosexual, 37
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 243,260-61, 277-78 (2014).
22 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691 (insisting that "[s]tate laws defining and regulating
marriage ... must respect the constitutional rights of persons" (citing Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
23 The general rule is that the rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are
enforced equally against the states and federal government. But there are exceptions to this
rule, as Brian Soucek's essay on "noncongruent equal protection" elegantly argues. Soucek
links Windsor to the Court's alienage discrimination cases, which apply different levels of
scrutiny to the interests offered by the state and federal governments when they defend their
laws. Brian Soucek, The Return of Noncongruent Equal Protection, 83 FORDHAM L. REv.
155 (2014).
24 Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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So, too, while I separated out the three stands of the opinion for clarity's sake,
in fact Justice Kennedy intertwines them throughout the opinion. Even the
doctrinal test used to invalidate DOMA is a mystery-the problem, we are
told, is that DOMA is both narrow and broad. It's not clear why that's a magic
combination under any account of the harm.
These mysteries pose a real challenge to anyone attempting to explain
Windsor. Any satisfying account of the opinion must explain them, which is
precisely what I hope to do in the next Part.
II. WINDSOR'S HIDDEN LOGIC: THE INTERLOCKING GEARS OF RIGHTS AND
STRUCTURE
Given the deep tensions between Windsor and conventional doctrine, you
won't be surprised to learn that in the immediate wake of the opinion,
commentators dismissed Kennedy as muddle-headed5 and began fighting over
whether Windsor was "really" an equality opinion or liberty opinion or a
federalism opinion.26 What I've found so dispiriting about much, but not all,27
25 See Young, supra note 19, at 40 ("Much of the early commentary ... has found Justice
Kennedy's opinion to be 'muddled' and unclear as to its actual rationale"); id. at n.4
(collecting sources); see also Richard S. Myers, The Implications of Justice Kennedy's
Opinion in United States v. Windsor, 6 ELON L. REV. 323, 323 (2014) ("Justice Kennedy's
opinion in Windsor is a disaster in terms of judicial craftsmanship."); Gerard Bradley, Great
Expectations, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 6:23 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/great-expectations/, archived at http://perma.cc/HQB9-
6UYP (claiming that the Windsor majority opinion is "simply incoherent"); Sandy
Levinson, A Brief Comment on Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Windsor, BALKINIZATION
(June 26, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.ca/2013/06/a-brief-comment-on-justice-
kennedys.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XDS8-SQNT (dismissing portions of the
opinion as "blather"). One need only look to the rhetoric of Justice Kennedy's own brethren
to have a sense of how the opinion has been received in some circles. See, e.g., Windsor,
133 S. Ct. at 2707, 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting the opinion involved
"amorphous federalism" and made "federalism noises"); id. at 2720 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(describing the "whiffs of federalism" in the opinion). For an effort to suggest that
Windsor's obscurity is a virtue rather than a vice, see Colin Starger, The Virtue of Obscurity,
59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 17 (2013) (casting Windsor's vagueness as a form of doctrinal
etiquette).
26 For an incomplete sampling, compare Neomi Rao, Windsor and the Problem with
Rights of Recognition, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Sept. 25, 2013, 5:25 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/09/25/windsor-problem-rights-recognition/, archived at
http://perma.cc/4EY8-SWA3 (arguing that Windsor turns on dignity, not federalism), with
H. Douglas NeJaime, Windsor's Right to Marry, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 219 (2013) (stating
that Windsor is a fundamental rights and equality opinion, not a federalism opinion), and
Deborah Hellman, Scalia Is Right: Justice Kennedy's Opinion in Windsor Doesn't Rest on
Federalism, BALKINIZATION (June 27, 2013, 5:29 PM),
http://balkin.blogspot.ca/2013/06/normal-0-false-false-false-en-us-x-none.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/5U8K-5WNR ("Respect for federalism does not play any role in justifying
the decision."), and Cass R. Sunstein, Gay-Marriage Ruling Safeguards Human Dignity,
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of the academic commentary on Windsor is the rigid insistence on an either/or
approach-that something is either federalism or liberty, either federalism or
equality. That view is entirely consistent with law professors' intellectual
habits-their preference for clarity, consistency, and conceptual categories. It's
also consistent with one of their intellectual blind spots-their dogged
insistence that "federalism" is an obstacle to debate and integration.2 8 Because
BLOOMBERG, June 26, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-26/gay-marriage-
ruling-safeguards-human-dignity.html, archived at http://perma.cc/94J8-FP7L (arguing that
the Court's decision is based on dignity, not federalism), and Helen J. Knowles, Taking
Justice Kennedy Seriously: Why Windsor Was Decided "Quite Apart from Principles of
Federalism" 31-32 (Dec. 17, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-2319487 (Windsor is an "equal liberty" opinion, not a federalism
opinion), and Eric Restuccia & Aaron Lindstrom, Federalism and the Authority of the States
to Define Marriage, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2013, 3:49 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/federalism-and-the-authority-of-the-states-to-define-
marriage/, archived at http://perma.cc/U7T7-KHEN (arguing that Windsor is a federalism
opinion and will not lead to the invalidate of state bans on same-sex marriage), and Dale
Carpenter, Windsor Productions: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 SUp. CT. REV. 183
(casting Windsor as part of the Court's equal protection jurisprudence).
27 See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, Federalism as a Way Station, 6 J. LEG. ANALYSIs 87 (2014);
Poirier, supra note 14, at 941; Rick Pildes, Why Justice Kennedy's DOM4 Opinion Has the
Unique Structure It Has, BALKINIZATION http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/06/why-justice-
kennedys-doma-opinion-has.html (June 26, 2013, 1:34 PM), archived at
http://perma.cc/L7FN-QQTG; Young, supra note 19; Mark Strasser, Windsor, Federalism
and the Future of Marriage Litigation, 37 HARV. J.L. & GENDER ONLrNE 1, 4 (2013); Linda
Greenhouse, Current Conditions, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (June 26, 2013, 6:57 PM),
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/current-conditions/, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZLG3-LMNQ; Levinson, supra note 25; Larry Tribe, DOMA, Prop 8, and
Justice Scalia's Intemperate Dissent, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26, 2013, 2:24 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/doma-prop-8-and-justice-scalias-intemperate-dissent/,
archived at http://perma.cc/R965-UJ87; Barnett, supra note 21; Rick Hills, Windsor and the
States' Power to Define Federal Constitutional Rights: Does Kennedy Revive Justice
Harlan's Theory of Rights?, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 26, 2013, 11:51 AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/06/windsor-and-the-states-power-to-
define-federal-constitutional-rights.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HQB8-4DQY; Ernest
A. Young and Erin C. Blondel, Federalism, Liberty and Equality in United States v.
Windsor, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 117, 118 (2013). While these authors see Windsor as blending
liberty, equality, and federalism, they have very different takes on the opinion's inner logic.
Some-like Pildes, Greenhouse, Siegel, Barnett, and Levinson-see the mix largely as the
product of compromise or at least an effort to temporize. See also sources cited infra note
105. Others-like Poirier, Young, Blondel, and Hills-attempt to offer an account of why
the doctrine is properly synthesized in this fashion. Young and Blondel's effort is
particularly noteworthy given the obvious influence their amicus brief had on Justice
Kennedy's opinion. See Brief of Federalism Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307).
28 See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958, 1965-70
(2014).
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law professors too often equate "Our Federalism" with our fathers' federalism,
they have missed the crucial truth undergirding Windsor, the hidden logic that
helps make sense of its many mysteries.
The key to understanding Windsor is to recognize that the ends of equality
and liberty are served by both rights and structure. It has simply been a mistake
to assume that the values associated with the rights side of the Constitution are
promoted solely by the rights side of the Constitution. And yet that mistake is
made by virtually all constitutional law theorists; it's even baked into our
constitutional textbooks.29 Those who write about the First and Fourteenth
Amendments are almost exclusively interested in dialogue and equality, and
those who write about structure are almost exclusively interested in the
distribution of power. Both groups have overlooked what I call the "discursive
benefits of structure"30-the ways in which federalism promotes dialogue and,
ultimately, integration.31 If you don't understand the ways in which federalism
and rights work together to promote change, you can't understand Windsor.
In this respect, the marriage-equality fight is a stand-in for a deep but
overlooked constitutional truth. Federalism and rights have long served as
interlocking gears moving us forward.32 Kennedy's opinion might not have
been a model of clarity, but at least it recognized that important fact. Windsor
is neither a rights opinion nor a federalism opinion. It is both. And that is
precisely as it should be.
What exactly do I mean when I characterize rights and structure as
interlocking gears? After all, we typically don't associate First Amendment or
29 See Heather K. Gerken, Abandoning Bad Ideas and Disregarding Good Ones for the
Right Reasons: Reflections on a Festschrift, 48 TULSA L. REV. 535, 536-37 (2013).
30 Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J.
1889, 1894 (2013).
31 See, e.g., Gerken, supra note 28; Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the
Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 6, 44-73 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism All the Way
Down]. By "federalism," I mean to include state, substate, local, and sublocal institutions, as
I think that federalism, properly understood, includes local sites as well. See Gerken,
Federalism All the Way Down, supra, at 21-33. While I focus here on the role states have
played in the marriage debate given the focus of Justice Kennedy's opinion and the
academic debate that followed, it's important to note that local-state contestation has been
an important part of the story as well. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) (describing San Francisco's effort to "dissent by deciding" in
the same-sex marriage debate); Poirier, supra note 14; see also Marc R. Poirier, Same-Sex
Marriage, Identity Processes, and the Kulturkampf: Why Federalism Is Not the Main Event,
17 TEMP. POL & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 387 (2008).
32 Gerken, supra note 28. Ernest Young and Erin Blondel also depict federalism and the
Fourteenth Amendment as "pervasively intertwined," but they are describing a doctrinal
relationship, one in which state law defines the class and inflects the Court's assessment of
the government interests at stake in an equal protection case. Young & Blondel, supra note
27, at 118-19. In their view, state law "operates in a micro sense, shaping individual-rights
doctrine." Id. at 133; see also Young, supra note 19.
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Fourteenth Amendment values with federalism. If anything, most people
assume that federalism undermines rather than promotes those values. It turns
out that most people are wrong.
Take a look at the marriage-equality debate through the lens of the First
Amendment (though we could just as easily view it through the lens of the
Fourteenth, because the aim of this movement is to instantiate a particular view
of equality). Proponents of marriage equality were dissenters for a long time.
And they did just what dissenters do when exercising their rights under the
First Amendment: they protested, they marched, they wrote editorials and blog
posts. All of that was important. But if you think about it, the moment when
the ground really shifted in the debate came when Massachusetts and San
Francisco began issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.33
There's a reason for that. The First Amendment, for all its glories, is fairly
thin gruel nowadays.34 The right to free speech is so deeply ingrained in our
political tradition that it is questioned only at the margins. As a result, the
marriage equality movement didn't lack opportunities to speak; it lacked a
chance to be heard. The most difficult problem for political outliers these days
isn't getting their message out; it's getting their message across. The marriage
equality movement needed what all dissenters need to get their ideas into the
national mix-a chance to push its issue on the agenda and force the majority
to engage.
It is very, very hard to do that with speech alone, which is why the First
Amendment is not enough these days. I could make that point by discussing a
long-standing political science literature on agenda-setting,35 but I can make it
more simply here by invoking our iconic image of a dissenter: someone
standing on a soapbox. Now ask yourself: what you do when you see someone
standing on a soapbox? You walk on by. Radio silence is the tool of the
powerful these days-it is always safer to ignore dissenters than to engage
with them. That's why the First Amendment is often not enough for those who
want to change how we see the world.
33 Here I mean to describe when the ground shifted in favor of same-sex marriage.
Hawaii, of course, really jumpstarted the debate when its Supreme Court threatened to make
same-sex marriage a reality there. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (1993). That decision, of
course, ignited the debate that led Congress to pass DOMA in the first place. For an
overview, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, BACKLASH,
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 57-60 (2013).
31 I develop this argument in greater detail in The Loyal Opposition, supra note 28, from
which the next few paragraphs are adapted.
35 FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER & BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN
POLITICS, (2d ed. 2009); ROGER W. COBB & CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING (2d ed. 1983); JOHN W.
KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d ed. 2010); WILLIAM H.
RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1988).
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That's where structure comes in. The discursive benefits of structure matter
a great deal to social movements. Federalism and localism supply different
platforms and different forms of advocacy for would-be dissenters.
36
Decentralization thus confers a variety of benefits on democracy's outliers that
the First Amendment, standing alone, cannot supply.
One of the reasons why federalism and localism matters for social
movements is that decentralization allows for what I call "dissenting by
deciding."37 It allows dissenters to put in place a real-life instantiation of their
ideas. As a result, they can force the majority to engage with them. When
dissenters stop speaking and start doing, the majority must act-it must
engage-even if all it wants to do is maintain the status quo. Better yet,
dissenters are no longer confined to abstract arguments. They can show you
something works rather than claiming it works.
The same-sex marriage movement has taken full advantage of the discursive
benefits of structure.38 When same-sex marriage became a reality in San
Francisco and Massachusetts, the debate changed. To begin, the political center
shifted: before that period, lots of progressive pragmatists endorsed civil
unions. When same-sex marriage became a reality, civil unions became the
compassionate conservative's default.
39
The debate shifted for the American people as well. The issue was no longer
abstract because news agencies were beaming pictures of happy pairs of brides
and grooms into our television sets. And while some, like California Governor
Schwarzenegger, had offered dour predictions about riots in the street,40 what
we saw instead was the not-so-riotous Gay Men's Choir serenading brides- and
grooms-to-be.
41
Elites also had to shift gears. Political leaders in states that didn't recognize
same-sex marriage had to decide whether to recognize marriages blessed by
those that did.42 That meant that politicians who had been reluctant to join the
36 See Gerken, supra note 28, at 1977-82.
37 Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 31.
38 Cf. Young & Blondel, supra note 27, at 119 ("Federalism has structured our national
conversation about same-sex marriage.").
39 Note for instance that the Compassionate Conservative-in-Chief--George W. Bush-
endorsed civil unions in the year after same-sex marriages took place in San Francisco and
Massachusetts. Elizabeth Bumiller, Bush Says His Party is Wrong to Oppose Gay Civil
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004, at A21.
40 Edward Epstein, Governor Fears Unrest Unless Same-Sex Marriages Are Halted, S. F.
CHRON. (Feb. 23, 2004, 4:00 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Govemor-fears-
unrest-unless-same-sex-marriages-2819189.php, archived at http://perma.cc/JN5R-4BM8.
41 Maura Dolan & Lee Romney, S.F. Wedding Planners Are Pursuing a Legal Strategy,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2004, at Al, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/22/local/me-marry22/3, archived at
http://perma.cc/Y5ZM-PYT2.
42 Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 31, at 1764-65.
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fray could no longer sit on the sidelines. And the Obama administration had to
decide whether to enforce DOMA going forward.
My focus here is the same-sex marriage debate, but you can play this game
with almost any topic. What moved immigration to the front page in recent
years? Arizona's anti-immigration initiatives. The debate over vote fraud
heated up when state legislatures started passing ID laws. The push for
universal healthcare got a turbo charge when Massachusetts put Obamacare's
predecessor into place. All of these examples involved classic forms of dissent.
But they also involved the use of structural arrangements-the gifts federalism
confers on dissenters-to move a debate forward and force engagement.
Federalism and localism facilitate national politics and national movements
in other ways. For example, decentralization allows dissenters to build their
case for change one step at a time. That is precisely what was at stake in
Romer,43 even if the Court lacked a doctrinal category for acknowledging that
fact.44 And building the case for change one step at a time is often the only way
to build the case for change.
The First Amendment, of course, technically lets you enter the so-called
"national conversation" from the first moment you begin to speak. You'll be
shocked to learn, however, that it's very hard to have a national conversation
without having a series of local ones first.45 National movements rarely begin
as national movements. They start small and grow. Leaders of social
movements have long used states and localities as sites for organizing and as
testing grounds for their ideas. These local platforms don't just facilitate early
mobilization, but also help connect nascent movements to the large and
powerful policymaking networks that fuel national politics.46 National policy,
after all, is a giant gear to move. As with a clock, you need movement from
lots of small, interlocking gears to move a bigger one. And that's precisely
43 See, e.g., Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Dynamics of Democracy: Travel, Premature
Predation, and the Components of Political Identity, 50 VAND. L. REv. 445, 452, 455
(1997).
44 That's why I agree with Linda McClain and Marc Poirier that Windsor displays deep
continuities with Romer. See Poirier, supra note 14, at 978-79; McClain, supra note 14.
45 Some of the best work on this subject has been done by Cristina Rodriguez. See
Cristina M. Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular
Perspectives, 123 YALE L.J. 2094 (2013) [hereinafter Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict];
Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH.
L. REv. 567 (2008); Cristina Rodriguez, Federalism and National Consensus (working
paper) (on file with the Boston University Law Review) [hereinafter Rodriguez, National
Consensus].
46 For a description of these networks, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism,
127 HARV. L. REv. 1077, 1124-30 (2013); Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American
Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J.
1564 (2006); Heather K. Gerken & Charles Tyler, The Myth of the Laboratories of
Democracy (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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what we saw in the marriage-equality debate-small movements leading to
bigger ones.
There is another important dimension to the discursive aspects of
structure-to the benefits conferred not by the First Amendment, but by
federalism. I will be a bit pedantic on this point, because I think it's crucially
important for deciphering the hidden logic of Windsor. What I call "dissenting
by deciding"47 allows dissenters to take advantage of the other powerful tool
that decentralization has provided them: regulatory integration.48 Because state
and national policymaking have become deeply interconnected, one can't
move without tugging the other along. That's obviously true of cooperative
federal regimes, where states shape federal law as they implement it. But it's
even true of those areas where there are no formally recognized regimes
established by statute. Criminal law is a good example.49 Federal and state
enforcement efforts have become so intertwined that three top criminal law
scholars have called it yet another version of "cooperative federalism."50 To
understand why, just think about how the marijuana legalization debate has
unfolded and ask yourself whether it's the national government or the states
that control federal drug policy at the end of the day. When states like
Colorado and Washington legalized marijuana, they effectively changed
federal policy as well because the federal government depends almost entirely
on states to enforce its marijuana prohibition. One scholar has gone so far as to
suggest that this informal integration effectively gives states the power to
nullify federal law.5 1 Or take a look at the giant fight over the implementation
of the ACA and ask yourself whether the states have a role in shaping national
healthcare policy.
52
Law professors, with their nationalist focus and penchant for clear
jurisdictional lines, often miss not just the existence of regulatory overlap, but
its significance to national politics and national policymaking. In our highly
" Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 31.
48 Gerken, Federalism All the Way Down, supra note 31, at 33-40; Heather K. Gerken,
Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013); Gerken, supra note 30.
49 Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARv. L. REV. 85, 116-19
(2014).
50 DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE STITH & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 8-
12 (2014).
51 Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States'
Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1425 (2009).
52 Theodore W. Ruger, Health Care Devolution and the Institutional Hydraulics of the
Affordable Care Act, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS 359 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013); Abbe R. Gluck, Federalism from
Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned Federalists' Gamble,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749 (2013); Heather Gerken & Ted Ruger, Real State Power Means
Getting in the Obamacare Game, HARVARD Bus. REVIEw ONLINE (Apr. 2, 2013),




interconnected regime, national law often depends on state policymakers, and
state law often depends on national policymakers. States and the national
government regulate shoulder to shoulder in a tight policymaking space.
Movement by one will be felt by the other, whether they are deliberately
giving each other a shove53 or just leaning on one another for support.
Because of this extraordinary level of regulatory integration and overlap,
states exercise unexpected sway over national policymaking by virtue of the
fact that national policymakers depend on the states to carry it out. Needless to
say, this high level of policymaking overlap confers an important advantage on
would-be dissenters, one that the First Amendment cannot supply. As I explore
below, would-be dissenters are able to change both state and local policy at the
same time, something that also has the potential to shift national debates.
Federalism, in short, doesn't just promote the same aims as the First
Amendment, but it also compensates for its shortcomings. It offers dissenters
different forms of advocacy, different platforms for mobilizing, and different
levers of change.54 These things matter a great deal if your aim is to alter the
status quo.
The converse is true as well. Where federalism fails dissenters, the First
Amendment often succeeds. The opportunities for "dissenting by deciding" are
catch-as-catch-can, emerging at different times and different places in the
governance landscape. The First Amendment is a constant, allowing dissenters
to speak and organize whenever they like. So, too, the First Amendment allows
dissenters to speak however they like. Federalism requires dissenters to pour
their ideas into the narrow policymaking space available. It requires them to
bargain and politic and strike deals. The First Amendment allows dissenters
the luxury of ideological purity, which can only be had outside the
policymaking arena.
That's why the First Amendment and federalism work so well in tandem,
and why both contribute to a well-functioning democracy. Dissenting speech
leads to debate, which leads to organizing, which leads to policymaking, which
in turn provides a rallying point for still more debate and organizing and
policymaking. Because the push for change moves through governance sites as
well as media sites, social movements include pragmatic insiders, forging
bargains from within, and principled outsiders, demanding more and better
from without. The key point to emphasize, however, is that federalism-far
from being the enemy of dissent-supplies the policymaking gears that are all
but essential for any movement to move forward.
I don't want to be unduly sunny about it. The arc of the universe may bend
toward justice,55 but the gears of rights and structure can move backwards, not
11 For examples of states giving the federal government a shove, see Jessica Bulman-
Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
5' For a more in-depth analysis, see Gerken, supra note 28.
55 Martin Luther King, Remaining Awake Through a Great Revolution, Address at the
National Cathedral, Washington D.C. (March 31, 1968), in 114 CONG. REc. 9397 (1968).
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just forwards. Retrenchment happens at the state and local levels just as
advancement does. My point is simply that federalism and its homely cousin
localism have been as important as rights in promoting discourse and
integration-the two grand democratic projects that have been so central to the
push for marriage equality.
III. EXPLAINING WINDSOR'S MYSTERIES: CLEARING THE CHANNELS OF
POLITICAL CHANGE
Once you think of rights and structure as interlocking gears, once you
recognize one can dissent by deciding, once you imagine federal dependence
on the states as an advantage for dissenters, the many mysteries of Windsor
seem less ... mysterious. What was at stake in Windsor was neither structure
nor rights, neither the right of the states to bless same-sex marriage nor the
right of same-sex couples to seek that blessing. What was at stake in Windsor
was how the debate over same-sex marriage was going to unfold-specifically,
whether states legalizing same-sex marriage would be allowed to tug the
federal government along with them. Windsor, at bottom, was about "clearing
the channels of political change.
'56
That's a big claim, and it's one that hasn't been made about Windsor, so let
me unpack it. Here I will offer you a read that I'm not ready to endorse-to the
contrary, it runs against much I've written about and embodies a variety of
risks I would be loathe to embrace.57 I nonetheless think that this read supplies
the best account of what Windsor actually says.
I should also emphasize that I'm not attempting here to offer a
psychoanalytic account of Justice Kennedy's decision. Windsor may just be
one of those moments when Justice Kennedy turns to the camera and speaks as
an observant human being rather than a judge.58 Or it may be that Windsor is
just an effort to kick the can a bit farther down the road, to put off a Supreme
56 JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105
(1980).
57 Infra note 104.
58 In that respect, it reminds me a bit of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in school
desegregation cases a few terms ago, where he unexpectedly began channeling Robert
Cover. There, Justice Kennedy admitted that "[flaws arise from a culture and vice versa"
and admitted that the distinction between de jure and de facto discrimination was nothing
more than a legal fiction. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701, 795 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). For an analysis, see Heather K. Gerken,
Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal Protection, 121 HARV. L. REv. 104, 116-18
(2007). Justice Kennedy has noticed-as have we all-that equality norms are being recast,
that liberty is being redefined. Supporters of same-sex marriage, he writes, were
"responding 'to the initiative of those who [sought] a voice in shaping the destiny of their
own times."' United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) (alteration in original)
(internal citations omitted). So, too, the opinion acknowledges that states have influenced
our "evolving understanding of the meaning of equality." Id. at 2693. That's not doctrinally
cogent, but it's true.
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Court decision on same-sex marriage for a while longer.59, Whatever was in
Justice Kennedy's heart or in the back of his mind when he wrote Windsor, this
read best fits with what the opinion actually says. This argument, then, is an
effort at construction and interpretation, ot divination.
A. Why Windsor Is About Both Rights and Structure
At the very least, we have a handle on Windsor's central mystery. It should
now be clear why federalism played such an important role in an opinion
nominally about individual rights-why Windsor blends rights and structural
analysis in such a seemingly haphazard fashion. As noted in Part I, Kennedy
repeatedly describes the right not as liberty or equality full stop, but as a right
recognized by the states. He writes almost as if the status of these rights under
the U.S. Constitution is contingent on their recognition by the states. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy repeatedly rebukes DOMA for interfering with the states'
efforts to recast liberty and equality rights for same-sex couples.
These arguments and rhetorical flourishes are hard to square with
conventional constitutional law, but they make a good deal more sense when
you recognize that federalism has long been used as a tool for pursuing
dissenting views and remapping our views on equality. Windsor might not
reflect current doctrine in this respect, but it certainly reflects current realities.
Federalism has provided a crucial means for the early proponents of same-sex
marriage to give content to the notions of liberty and equality, just as Justice
Kennedy himself observed.60 By extending liberty and equality norms to the
deepest reaches of individuals' lives, advocates of same-sex marriage were-
they are-changing what liberty and equality mean in this country. And
advocates have been doing as much by appealing to constitutional values as
appealing to courts, as much by politicking as litigating. It seems to me that the
bulk of this work has been done on the democratic and social front, not the
legal one. The courts have been the Johnnies-come-lately to this constitutional
change.
Justice Kennedy plainly understood that, as was made clear by the
remarkable paean to social change at the beginning of the merits analysis.61
While that understanding is hard to square with traditional doctrinal categories,
it has the distinct advantage of being true.
The Court's opinion, for instance, certainly doesn't fit with conventional
notions of state sovereignty. That's just fine with me, as I think the sovereignty
account is mostly claptrap. Kennedy is correct to leave open the possibility that
one day the Court will play the constitutional supremacy trump card and
announce marriage equality as the law of the land.
59 For arguments to this effect, see sources cited infra note 105. Given that the Supreme
Court has just granted certiorari on this question, supra note 2, it may well be that this is the
Term in which the Court rules on this question.
61 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689, 2692-93; see also supra note 58.
61 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2689; see also supra note 58.
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So, too, Windsor also doesn't fit with the idea that rights are enduring, part
of the brooding omnipresence waiting to be discovered by judges. That, too, is
fine with me. Rights are built, not discovered; they are demanded, not
bequeathed. Windsor is correct to notice that as well.
But while Windsor looks like neither a conventional rights nor a
conventional structure opinion, it does fit beautifully with the idea that rights
and structure serve as interlocking gears moving our democracy forward. Like
others,62 I think Windsor can be read as an effort-albeit a tentative one-to
think concretely about the relationship between social change and
constitutional change. But I have a quite different take on the fashion in which
Windsor is doing so. I read Windsor not as an effort to accommodate political
change, but as an effort to clear the channels of political change. And by
"clearing the channels of political change," I don't just mean that the opinion
gives the states more time to "deliberate" on these issues, as some have
suggested.63 By getting rid of DOMA, Windsor changed the conditions in
which deliberation (and all the lobbying and politicking that accompanies it)
would occur. That's because Windsor ensured that proponents of same-sex
marriage would be able to take advantage of the discursive benefits of
structure.64
62 Infra note 64 (collecting sources).
63 Larry Tribe does not offer the argument I supply here, but he does suggest in passing
that Kennedy wants to leave "the most contentious questions about same-sex marriage for
the political process to continue grappling with .... " Tribe, supra note 27. Invoking my
work and the work of others on what I've called the "discursive benefits of structure," Neil
Siegel refers in passing to the traditional notion of states as laboratories of democracy-here
providing "normative guidance about the constitutional meaning of equality and liberty...
." Siegel, supra note 27, at 120. But he thinks the better reading of Windsor is that it
"signal[s] a commitment to a certain conception of constitutional rights all the way down"
and thus "does not seem best described only in terms of federalism." Id. at 122. Instead, he
casts federalism as an effort to temporize-a "way station" designed simply to allow "states
and courts to continue deliberating about same-sex marriage" until the Court is ready to step
in. Id. at 134.
64 Or perhaps not full advantage. The provision of DOMA affecting whether states must
recognize same-sex marriages from other states still stands, thus preventing state decisions
to allow same-sex couples to marry from spilling over into states that do not allow such
marriages. As I've written elsewhere, policymaking spillovers can provide an important
catalyst for change, as states forced to live under the laws and policies of other states often
seek a national referee to resolve such dispute and thereby tee up issues for national debates.
Heather K. Gerken & Ari Holtzblatt, The Political Safeguards of Horizontal Federalism,
113 MICH. L REv. 57 (2014). A number of commentators have already begun to take up the
question of cross-state recognition of same-sex marriages, including the always-thoughtful
Will Baude. See, e.g., William Baude, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage After
Windsor, 8 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 150 (2013); Meg Penrose, Something to [Lex Loci]
Celebrationis?: Federal Marriage Benefits Following United States v. Windsor, 41
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 41 (2013); Mark Strasser, Windsor, Federalism, and the Future of
Marriage Litigation, 37 HARv. J. L. & GENDER ONLINE 1 (2014).
[Vol. 95:587
WINDSOR'S MAD GENIUS
As every IL knows, the Court has a variety of strategies for dealing with
changes in the facts. But the Court has a harder time figuring out what to do
with social change, as is made clear by Casey's pained efforts to explain
Brown's reversal of Plessy65 or the Court's struggles over whether it should
look backward or forward in determining the contours of substantive due
process.66 When we rethink the content of our character, it often requires
judges to rethink the content of our Constitution, and that's a task for which the
courts are ill equipped.
Academics have, of course, stepped into the breach, supplying judges with a
variety of theories for thinking about how social change should be folded into
constitutional doctrine. The "living constitution," Bruce Ackerman's
"constitutional moments,"67 Bill Eskridge and John Ferejohn's work on
"superstatutes,"68 David Strauss' common law constitutionalism,69 and a
variety of theories on democratic constitutionalism70 and the like71-all offer a
65 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 862-63 (1992) (discussing Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954)).
66 Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986).
67 See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,
TRANSFORMATIONS]; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION
(2014).
68 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010).
69 See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1996); David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARv. L.
REV. 1457 (2001) [hereinafter Strauss, Irrelevance].
70 See, e.g., LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and
Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 927 (2006); Larry D. Kramer, Popular
Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REV. 959 (2004); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of
the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003); Robert C. Post & Reva B.
Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five
Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007); Robert C. Post,
The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARP. L. REV. 4, 8 (2002); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture,
Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94
CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
71 Other works include NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
(2004); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: FROM THEORY TO POLITICS
(1996); MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003) [hereinafter TUSHNET,
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER]; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE
COURTS (1999) [hereinafter TUSHNET, AWAY FROM THE COURTS]; J.M. Balkin, Populism and
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frame for thinking about how to connect the fact of social change to the
necessity of constitutional change.
Needless to say, the reception of these theories by the Court has been...
tepid. One need look no farther for confirmation of this fact than Shelby
County,72 which blithely overturned a statute that academics had designated as
a superstatute.7
3
It's not hard to imagine why. Even a judge open-as Kennedy plainly is
74-
to the possibility of culture shaping law might reasonably be skeptical of these
approaches. After all, theories about the relationship between social change
and constitutional change are plagued by the same difficulty-the rule of
recognition problem.75 Despite the best efforts of the academy, we don't have
an easy way of identifying when constitutional moments occur, when a social
movement does or should influence constitutional doctrine, even when a
statute has moved into the "super" category.
Conservative judges might be forgiven, then, for being wary of such
approaches. They might sensibly worry that if these approaches are defined too
loosely, they'll do little more than provide an excuse for importing the views
of liberal elites into the Constitution.
A rule of recognition that pivots off of state and local decisions, however, is
less vulnerable to this risk. It requires judges to identify what's been done
rather than take the measure of-or simply absorb-the social zeitgeist.
Moreover, the test for what's been done doesn't require judges to decide
what an election actually meant. Legislation doesn't need to reach some hard-
to-specify level of importance to matter for this purpose; it just needs to be
passed in a good number of states. Better yet, the subject of state statutes tends
Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE L.J. 1935 (1995) (reviewing CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993)); J.M. Balkin & Sanford
Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REv. 963 (1998); Jack M.
Balkin & Sanford V. Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: From Partisan
Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 489 (2006); Jack M.
Balkin, Respect-Worthy: Frank Michelman and the Legitimate Constitution, 39 TULSA L.
REv. 485 (2004); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional
Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular
Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2596 (2003); Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1998).
72 Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); see ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN,
supra note 68; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J.
1215 (2001).
73 See, e.g., EsKR1DGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 68, at 19. Or DOMA itself, also
designated as a superstatute. Id.
71 As Linda McClain notes, Justice Kennedy is acutely aware of the "evolutionary
process engaged in by citizens and their elected representatives" to change the
"constitutional status of homosexuals." McClain, supra note 14, at 463.
75 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 67, at 91; Eskridge & Ferejohn,
supra note 72, at 1266, 1275-76.
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to be more specific than that of national elections. It's easier to figure out what
a law legalizing same-sex marriage means than it is to figure out what the 1968
presidential election meant.
76
The Court knows this, which is presumably why it so often looks to state
legislatures in evaluating what is cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment.77 People worry about mere "nose counting,"78 and rightly so. But
for those who worry about judges' personal views slipping into constitutional
doctrine, nose counting may well be superior to atmospheric judgments about
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in this day and age.
79
It would be tempting to stop there-to equate Windsor with the Eighth
Amendment cases or to imagine federalism as a face-saving means of folding
social change into the Constitution-a fig leaf that lets the Justices adapt to the
times without forcing them to offer squishy odes to the living Constitution.
80
But Windsor isn't the right case for that conclusion. The Eighth Amendment
cases come at or near the end of the game, when a new national consensus has
emerged and the Court is mostly policing outliers.81 Windsor, in sharp contrast,
is focused on the process of social change in media res. At the time Windsor
was decided, the marriage equality movement was at an inflection point, with
twelve states and the District of Columbia having legalized same-sex
76 Cf. Strauss, Irrelevance, supra note 69, at 1504 ("[T]hese forms of popular rule... do
not provide a canonical text to be scrutinized and interpreted.").
77 This practice extends well beyond the Eighth Amendment. Corinna Barrett Lain, The
Unexceptionalism of "Evolving Standards," 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 368-69 (2009) ("From
due process to equal protection, from the First Amendment to the Fourth and Sixth, the
Supreme Court routinely-and explicitly-determines constitutional protection based on
whether a majority of states agrees with it."); Hills, supra note 27; Young & Blondel, supra
note 27, at 135-36.
78 See, e.g., Ernest Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 148, 155 (2005).
71 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 335 (1989) ("The public sentiment expressed in
these and other polls and resolutions may ultimately find expression in legislation, which is
an objective indicator of contemporary values upon which we can rely."); Roderick M.
Hills, Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 17, 18 (2009) (suggesting this practice
limits judicial discretion); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Doctrinal Side of Majority Will, 2010
MICH. ST. L. REV. 775, 789 ("Constitutional interpretation involves judgment calls, and state
counting provides an objective, contemporary measure of how those calls should be made.
The Justices have said as much themselves."). Not everyone rests easy on this front. See,
e.g., Young, supra note 78, at 153-56 (worrying that Justices can import their personal
views into a nose-counting decision by altering "the denominator" for the count, as they do
when examining foreign law); Lain, supra, at 793 (acknowledging the practice can be
"subject to manipulation").
80 Cf Siegel, supra note 27, at 29 ("The Windsor Court used federalism in the service of
living Constitutionalism.").
81 Cf Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929, 933-34 (2014)
(describing and recategorizing the process of policing outliers).
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marriage.8 2 The game was far from over, which is why Windsor wasn't giving
a constitutional blessing to a new consensus.
How do we think about Windsor given that unusual fact? I'm an election
law scholar as well as student of federalism, so it's hard for me not to view all
of this through the lens of Ely's Democracy and Distrust.83 A process account
helps me understand why Kennedy was willing to invalidate a federal law
without saying anything, either way, about the constitutional status of similar
state laws. The Court in Windsor was, in effect, "clearing the channels of
political change"84 by allowing proponents of marriage equality to take full
advantage of the discursive benefits of structure that I described above. This
read, while admittedly controversial, manages to make sense of the many
mysteries of Windsor and highlights the ways in which the First Amendment
and federalism serve as interlocking gears moving national debates forward, as
I describe in the next Section.
B. Clearing the Channels of Political Change
As I noted in Section III.A, the core question scholars have posed about
Windsor-why does it mingle rights-based and structural analysis in such an
unusual fashion?--can be answered when one recognizes that rights and
structure have served as interlocking gears moving us forward. But the
connections between this neglected constitutional truth and Windsor's many
mysteries run deeper once one casts the opinion as an effort to clear the
channels of political change and allow the marriage equality movement to and
take full advantage of the discursive benefits of structure.
Remember that DOMA reflected what once was the national view, forged in
the wake of Hawaii's threat to allow same-sex marriage in 1996.85 But the
brouhahas in the states over same-sex marriage signaled to the Court that the
consensus was unraveling. Justice Kennedy is quite explicit on this point.86 As
Cristina Rodriguez has written,87 federalism is all but built to deal with an
82 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2389 (2013).
83 ELY, supra note 56, at 76-77.
84 Perhaps, though, I should be invoking not just John Hart Ely, but the great Guido
Calabresi as well. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982) (suggesting that judges should update statutes through common-law decisions by
invalidating statutes that no longer enjoy contemporary majority support).
85 For a history, see Klarman, supra note 33.
86 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (explaining that while "until recent
years, many citizens had not even considered the possibility that two persons of the same
sex might aspire to occupy the same status and dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful
marriage," now "came the beginnings of a new perspective, a new insight"); id. ("New York
acted to enlarge the definition of marriage to correct what its citizens and elected
representatives perceived to be an injustice that they had not earlier known or understood.");
id. at 2693 describing the "evolving understanding of the meaning of equality").
87 Rodriguez, Negotiating Conflict, supra note 45.
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unraveling consensus. That's not because it allows us to hide in our own
policymaking enclaves, be they red or blue. It's because it gives us a chance to
work these problems out in sites that are more manageable than the national
stage, to have a series of local conversations before we have a national one.
88
The Court would surely have stepped in if the federal government tried to
silence proponents of marriage equality in media res. What it did in Windsor
was take a similar stance on the structural side. It made sure that federal law
didn't inhibit the debate running through the states, which Jessica Bulman-
Pozen casts as staging grounds for national politics.89 As Justice Kennedy
points out, DOMA's very purpose was to short-circuit the debate about
marriage equality. The Act, he writes, was intended to "discourage enactment
of state same-sex marriage laws"90 and "'put a thumb on the scales' in favor
of a traditional conception of marriage.9'
Now think back to of Windsor's most puzzling mysteries: the doctrinal test
that Justice Kennedy deploys in Romer and Windsor. Both focus on the fact
that the laws invalidated were both narrowly targeted and far-reaching, a test
that doesn't make much sense of any of the conventional injuries attributed to
Windsor. To be sure, these two characteristics are nominally treated as
evidence of animus in the opinion. But they fit much more neatly with
Kennedy's worries about DOMA shutting down a debate just as it was taking
wing.92 The amendment challenged in Romer was deliberately designed to shut
down a nascent debate by putting questions of LGBT equality out of reach of a
88 For an elegant exploration of the importance of such conversations to national debates,
see Rodriguez, National Consensus, upra note 45.
89 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 46, at 1119.
90 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693.
91 Id. (citation omitted).
92 I think you can identify a similar concern in a Voting Rights Act decision recently
authored by Justice Kennedy. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry,
548 U.S. 399 (2006). As I've argued elsewhere, in LULAC, Justice Kennedy deployed equal
protection analysis to condemn efforts to shut down a burgeoning effort to mobilize Latino
voters. See Gerken, supra note 58, at 110-13. Marc Poirier has put forward a deep,
sociologically inflected account of the role the local---even the personal and the corporate-
play in forging our understandings of liberty and equality. His account links Windsor and
Romer together as part of the bottom-up development of societal views on dignity that is
"managed by governments at various levels of scale." Poirier, supra note 14, at 939, 943. In
Poirier's view, local and state activities are part and parcel of a broad range of social
interactions, which include "micro performances" as well as personal, public, informal and
formal interactions taking place within a variety of institutions. All of these interactions,
Poirier argues, help social custom evolve. Id. at 940, 957. Poirier suggests that "Justice
Kennedy is primarily relying on state processes, including judicial review at the state level,
to articulate changed social understandings as they bubble up to the level of law." Id. at 983.
But he, too, thinks that Justice Kennedy saw DOMA as a conversation stopper. In Poirier's
words, it "blocked the piecemeal, checkerboard transitional process of states responding to
citizens' evolving perceptions of human need and dignity." Id. at 976.
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group that was powerful at the local level but couldn't win a fight at the state
level. DOMA was deliberately designed to shut down a nascent debate by
putting federal marriage policy out of reach of groups that were powerful at the
state level but couldn't yet win a fight at the national level.
The test Kennedy uses in both cases-one that focuses on whether the
legislation is both narrow and broad93-makes perfect sense if you want to
prevent someone from shutting down a nascent debate. After all, if you want to
put a debate out of reach of advocates, you have to draft a law broadly and
narrowly at the same time. You must write broadly because you don't want to
leave an opening for supporters to find another policymaking path to pursue
their goal. But you must also write narrowly so you can precisely target the
debate you want to shut down and avoid interfering with the usual warp and
woof of state and local decisionmaking. In Romer, that meant shunting all
debates over LGBT equality to the state level without treading on the ability of
local decisionmakers to pass laws regarding housing, employment and the like.
In DOMA, that meant a wholesale federal ban on recognizing same-sex
marriages that did not interfere with federal recognition of other marriages
recognized by the states.
You might object that it's implausible to imagine Windsor as an effort to
clear the channels of political change because the marriage equality movement
was doing just fine with DOMA on the books, thank you very much. But that
argument misses the crucial ways in which states policies shape federal ones.
By lifting DOMA's restrictions, Justice Kennedy enabled proponents of
marriage equality to take full advantage of the regulatory integration between
the states and the federal government that I described in Part II.
Think again to the reasons why regulatory integration provides such an
important tool for dissenters. First, state policymaking can help set the national
agenda and force national policymakers to engage. The general rule in the
marriage domain has been that federal lawmakers followed state lawmakers'
lead. DOMA broke that rule, as Justice Kennedy himself points out. DOMA,
he writes, was enacted "[a]gainst th[e] background" in which federal law
followed state law.94 Before Windsor, when the states changed their positions
on same-sex marriage, the federal government didn't have to adjust. Now
when the states move on marriage quality, they get to do what they do in so
many arenas: tug the federal government along with them. In the wake of
Windsor, then, the federal government has had to engage with the question of
marriage equality.95 It has had to figure out how to work same-sex marriages
93 The statute targets a narrow class-same-sex couples who can marry under state law-
but affects a large swath of federal statutes. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-96.
9' Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692.
95 Some have argued that the shift in federal policy has, in turn, fueled still more change
at the state level. Doug NeJaime, for instance, notes that states banning same-sex marriage
"keeps those couples from significant federal rights and benefits," NeJaime, supra note 26,
at 243, a fact that some believe has influenced the outcome of at least one of the lawsuits
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into the federal regulatory system. It's precisely that type of forced
engagement hat federalism facilitates in an integrated regime like ours.
A second and related gift associated with e discursive benefits of structure
is the opportunity to offer a real-world instantiation of an ideal, and here again
regulatory integration matters. If you are going to offer a real-world
instantiation of an ideal, you want to come as close to real-world conditions as
you can. Granting same-sex couples marriage rights under state law obviously
matters a great deal. But in a regulatory domain where federal law generally
follows state law, the full instantiation of that ideal requires that same-sex
marriages receive not just state recognition, but federal recognition.
That's just what Windsor guaranteed. And Justice Kennedy is quite self-
conscious of that fact. The problem with DOMA, he writes, was that it
converted into "second-class" marriages those the state wishes to bless fully,
96
it targeted "a class of persons that the laws of New York, and of 11 other
States, have sought o protect,"97 it undermined a "relationship deemed by the
State worthy of dignity .... "98
As noted above, none of this matters under traditional rights-based analysis:
you are either a protected class or you aren't, you either have a liberty right or
you don't. But this distinction does matter if you care about the discursive
benefits of structure. DOMA's crucial flaw-what Kennedy calls its "essence"
-was its "interfere[nce] with state sovereign choices about who may be
married."99 As Linda McLain had noted,0 0 DOMA interfered with states'
efforts to provide full marital benefits to the same-sex marriages it had
endorsed.
Just as one would expect, the federal government has made substantial
changes to its policies to accommodate the reality of same-sex marriage in
Windsor's wake. Windsor has thus prompted federal officials to confirm a
point that proponents of marriage equality have long been trying to make at the
state level-same-sex marriage works in practice and does not lead to the
parade of horribles routinely invoked on the other side. Here again, the ability
to convert an idea from an abstract ideal to a concrete reality is one of the gifts
federalism supplies to dissenters.
Thanks to Windsor, proponents of same-sex marriage can now go to
Washington armed with excellent proof that the federal system can, in fact,
accommodate same-sex couples. Because Windsor has allowed advocates to
take full advantage of the discursive benefits of structure in an integrated
regulatory regime, the states can now tug the federal government along with
being brought. See Poirier, supra note 14, at 988-90 (discussing Garden State Equal. v.
Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013)).
96 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-94.
97 Id. at 2690; see also id. at 2692, 2693.
98 Id. at 2692.
99 Id. at 2681, 2693.
100 McClain, supra note 14.
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them. As a result, advocates now have a real-life instantiation of the federal
policy they seek to pursue even before they've managed to convince federal
lawmakers or the Court itself to do the right thing.
Note also how the Court's decision in Windsor even cleared the channel for
political change at the judicial level (courts, of course, have long been sites of
politicking for social movements). Just as DOMA loomed large over state
legislators, uncertainty about the Court's view on these issues loomed large
over lower-court judges. Windsor, in effect, licensed lower court judges to take
part in the process of social change as well. As a result, dozens and dozens of
judges invalidated same-sex marriage bans in Windsor's wake.10 1 This social
fact has also changed the conditions in which the debate over the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage will take place when the Court
considers the question this spring.
I recognize that an effort to clear the channels of political change is a
controversial move, one that even I am uncomfortable with. But it captures
something deep about how the discursive benefits of structure work in practice.
Indeed, if you want to understand the ways in which "Our Federalism" allows
dissenters to influence both state and national policies, just think about the
effects states can now have on federal policy in the wake of Windsor. High
levels of regulatory overlap have long ensured that dissenters can affect state
and federal policy at the same time, provided a statute like DOMA isn't
standing in the way. And now DOMA is no longer standing in the way.
The notion that Windsor was clearing the channels of political change even
makes sense of the last of the opinion's many mysteries. Remember that the
opinion is written as if same-sex marriage is not yet a right, but it might be
soon. But that is precisely what one would write if one were clearing the
channels of change. Indeed, by dislodging an outdated consensus at the
national level, Justice Kennedy has given proponents of marriage equality a
good deal more running room. They can tug federal policymakers along with
the states. They can go to Congress or the Court armed with far better evidence
than they've had before that same-sex marriage works at both the state and
federal level. Indeed, all the policymaking homework for integrating same-sex
marriages into the federal system will already have been done by the time this
question reaches Congress or the Court. By lifting DOMA, in sum, Justice
Kennedy has ensured that the same-sex marriage debate will unfold differently
than it would have had it been confined solely to the states.
That's what I meant when I invoked Ely's phrase about "clearing the
channels of political change." Justice Kennedy didn't just insist that the
national government stand aside while the people, in their capacity as state
peoples, rethought the old consensus. He insisted that the marriage-equality
"I LAMBDA LEGAL, FAVORABLE RULINGS IN MARRIAGE EQUALITY CASES SINCE US. v.
WINDSOR (2015), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/post-




movement have access to the full range of structural advantages that federalism
confers. He insisted that when the smaller gears of state policymaking move in
the direction of marriage equality, the larger gear of federal policymaking
move with them. And, consistent with the notion of "clearing the channels of
political change," he ensured that the interlocking gears of our democracy-
rights and structure-were free to move without committing to them moving in
a particular direction.
Someone accustomed to the conventions of federalism might think that I'm
describing something akin to sovereignty here-the power of the states or their
citizenries to make policy without interference from the federal government.
But that just brings us back to the outmoded sovereignty account that Windsor
eschews. There are deep continuities between rights, on the one hand, and a
sovereignty account, on the other. Both rest on an autonomy account-the
right to be left alone; the right to do something without interference; the right
to preside over one's own domain, be it policymaking or personal. If this were
about being left alone, however, the federal government could not stop state
citizenries from refusing to marry same-sex couples, and Windsor plainly did
not rule as such. But Windsor also didn't hold that a federal right to marry
exists, either.
The advantage to viewing Windsor through an Elyan lens is that one doesn't
have to rely on notions of sovereignty or traditional domains of autonomy, all
of which have been eroded by the passage of time. Instead, one can look to the
robust role that states play in maintaining a thriving national democracy.
0 2
The other advantage to viewing Windsor through an Elyan lens is that one
also doesn't have to imagine the Court "conferring" a right upon same-sex
couples. Instead, one can imagine them forging it themselves. The marriage-
equality movement confirms one of the central insights of the nationalist
school of federalism,'0 3 of which I am a proud founding member: states don't
undermine national politics; they make national politics possible. And they do
so not by operating separate and apart from national debates and national
policymaking, but from being deeply interconnected to both. And if you
value-as I do-the benefits that structure, governance, and "dissenting by
deciding" confer upon democracy's outliers, it's at least plausible that there
would be times when you want to be sure that an old consensus-frozen into a
far-reaching federal policy-doesn't prevent us from finishing the
conversation that democracy's outliers have begun in their states. There are
times when you'd want to be sure that it's possible for the smaller gears of
state lawmaking to move the giant gear of federal lawmaking forward.
102 Gerken, supra note 30, at 1890-1901.
103 Id. at 1889-90.
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CONCLUSION
As I noted above, I'm not ready to endorse this read of Windsor as the
Platonic ideal, all things considered. It has rule-of-recognition problems of its
own, not to mention a whole host of other problems embedded within it.
0 4
But I do think this read of Windsor has two, distinct advantages over the
alternatives. First, it's the only interpretation that makes sense of the many
mysteries of Kennedy's opinion. Scholars have offered lots of arguments about
Windsor as a way station or a temporary reprieve or a heavy hint from the
Court,0 5 and they certainly have their realpolitik point. But those reads don't
square with interstices of the analysis, let alone the unusual rhetoric of the
opinion. My aim is to offer an internalist account of the decision, not a
psychoanalytic one-the best read of what the opinion actually says, not an
effort to divine what the opinion might mean.
Second, and more importantly, the account I've offered here reflects an
important constitutional truth about how our democracy functions, one that has
not gotten the attention of the courts or the vast majority of law professors to
write on the subject. Because of our penchant for abstraction, clear conceptual
categories, and tidy doctrinal lines, too many law professors have condemned
Windsor as muddleheaded and thereby missed its true genius.
104 The concerns are fairly obvious. Even if a court were able to identify when a national
consensus has started to fray, it would then have to make exquisitely difficult judgments
about whether the political process is working properly. The notion that DOMA could be
invalidated on the grounds I suggest above is especially worrisome for someone like me,
who both believes fervently in the values associated with dissent at the state and national
level but also thinks it's perfectly acceptable for the national government to play the
national supremacy trump card whenever it wishes.
105 Siegel, supra note 27; see also Cruz, supra note 26, at 46-47 (describing Windsor as a
temporizing strategy); Michael J. Klarman, Windsor and Brown: Marriage Equality and
Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REv. 127, 140-41 (2013) (characterizing Windsor as an effort
to temporize); Pildes, supra note 27 (arguing that the structure of the opinion reflects Justice
Kennedy's desire to put off deciding the core issue); Mary L. Dudziak, Windsor: LGBT
Version of Reed v. Reed?, BALKINIZATION (June 26, 2013, 4:26 PM),
http:/Ibalkin.blogspot.ca/2013/06/windsor-lgbt-version-of-reed-v-reed.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/K8JM-DE7L ("[Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971)] was an indication that
the rights of women would finally be taken seriously by the Court. We might also take
Windsor as a signal that more robust equal protection rights for LGBT folks is on the
way.").
Jack Balkin thinks the Court has been far more strategic, issuing an ambiguous decision
in Windsor to signal that lower courts should invalidate bans on same-sex marriage ven
where their legislatures won't, all with an eye to prod a supermajority of the states to license
same-sex marriage so that the Court can step in, declare the game is over, and police
whatever outliers remain. Jack Balkin, The Supreme Court Simulates a State Bandwagon
Effect in Favor of Same-Sex Marriage, BALKINIZATION (Oct. 7, 2014, 11:03 AM),
http://bankio.blogspot.com/2014/1 0/the-supreme-court-simulates-state.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/7VYZ-CLTU.
[Vol. 95:587
WINDSOR 'S MAD GENIUS
Or maybe we've just ignored what Boston University's Larry Yackle wrote
about the gay rights movement way back in 1993. He predicted that "the
constitutional principles and rules we have developed to date will disappoint us
at every turn" and that there will be no "fixed and firm doctrinal markers" to
lead the way because "we are in ... a real and human mess; it will not be
disciplined by abstractions alone."106
Windsor, for all its demerits, recognizes that we are in a real and human
mess and cannot be disciplined by abstractions alone. It recognizes that rights
and structure-long thought to be inimical or at least orthogonal to one
another-are deeply and importantly connected to one another and to the
central projects of our democracy. They are interlocking gears, moving the
projects of discourse and integration forward. And while constitutional
doctrine has not yet recognized this important fact, that's the doctrine's
problem, not Windsor's.
106 Larry W. Yackle, Parading Ourselves: Freedom of Speech at the Feast of St. Patrick,
73 B.U. L. REV. 791, 793 (1993).
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